Climate change is the biggest challenge for humanity and international climate negotiation have been put in place to deal with the challenge. However, the international climate negotiations have not been able to achieve the global binding climate agreement to limit the warming under 2 0 C during this century. Previously the literature has covered the impacts, costs, benefits and the efficiency in terms of greenhouse gas emission reduction, sustainable development, climate justice and technology transfer. However less focus has been put on the institutional aspect of international climate negotiations. The aim of the paper is to describe the outcome of the international climate negotiations by institutional analysis and development framework. We conducted a literature review of the international climate negotiations including unilateralism, multilateralism, minilateralism and carbon markets. The results assist to clarify the role of climate governance approaches in tackling climate change.
Introduction
Climate change is the biggest challenge for humanity and to avoid the climate change catastrophe political decisions and technology are needed to put in place. The political decisions can be studied based on rational choice model or system model. Our study is based on institutional model assuming that the institutions have a great impact on which policies are likely to be implemented. The international institutions can be defined as a set of rules used by set of countries to organize repetitive activities. The United Nations Framework (UNFCCC) has formed a such set of rules for climate change mitigation and they set the frames for climate action. The UNFCCC was established in 1994 to answer the challenge of climate change framed by the the sovereignty of states as well as common but differentiated responsibilities. At first the objective of the international climate negotiation was to set a binding target for emission reductions, but since that proved to be impossible the outcome of the Paris conference was pledges. The international negotiations have agreed to limit the global warming under 1.5 0 C while the national policies in many countries would lead to warmer climate.
Previously the literature has explained the impacts of climate change climate mitigation such as costs (Rogelj; McCollum; Reisinger; Meinshausen; & Riahi, 2013) , (Stern, 2006) , sustainable development (Beg, ym., 2002 ) (Swart; Robinson; & Cohen, 2003) and technology transfer (Abbott, 2009) (Dechezleprêtre; Glachant; Haščič; Johnstone; & Ménière, 2011) .
This paper focuses on the institutional characteristic of the international climate negotiations. The aim of the paper is to describe the outcome of the international climate negotiations by institutional analysis and development framework. The institutional analysis and development framework is a systematic method for analysing analysing institutions (Polski & Elinor, 1999) This analysis consists of policy arena, action arena, patterns of interaction and outcomes. The figure 1 presents our simplified model of institutional analysis and development framework. The policy analysis consists of physical world, the community and the rules. The action arena means the decisions and action put in place. Our analysis includes the most significant strategies of both negotiating and implementing climate change mitigation. Unilateralism, multilateralism, minilateralism, emission trading, carbon taxes and pledges are the most significant aspects of climate governance.
Figure 1. Institional analysis and development framework

Climate change in the international policy arena
Analysis of the international policy arena is part of institutional analysis and development framework. Achieving an ambitious binding global climate agreement is difficult to negotiate because the burden of climate change is not equally divided. Some countries can even benefit from climate change by expanded farmland. The policy arena in climate change is highly fragmented and the resources and funds to implement the necessary actions are mainly channeled through governments with different resources and objectives.
Energy is the most significant part of climate policy. The growth of energy use is also leading to growth of energy goods. Energy policies in a country can impact the climate change mitigation in other countries. As the energy markets gets liberalized the significance of institutions increases. The international policy arena for climate change is shaped by lack of political will for cooperation, lack of binding targets, sovereignty of states and free rider problem. (Deepti, 2012) .
Methodology
This is a literature review of the international climate negotiations to conduct a institional analysis and development frameworks. At first I collected available articles from google by using the key words, climate change mitigation, unilateralism, multilateralism, pledges, market based approach and carbon tax because these are the major aspects of climate governance. To limit the number of articles we have only looked at the articles published after 2012.
Results
In total 54 articles were reviewed. A majority of articles focused generally on international climate policy and climate governance. Table 1 presents the articles reviewed. (Gupta & Mason, 2016 ) (Bodansky & Rajamani, 2013 ) (Ventura, et al., 2015 ) (Stewart, et al., 2013) (Moncel & Asselt, 2012 ) (Otto, et al., 2014 ) (Marcucci & Turton, 2013 ) (Kriegler, et al., 2015 ) (Riahi, et al., 2015 ) (Arroyo-Currás, et al., 2015 ) (Briner & Prag, 2013 ) (Chaturvedi, 2015) (Glomsrød, et al., 2013 ) (Gilley & Kinsella, 2015) Carbon tax 10 (Strand, 2013) (Alton, et al., 2014 ) (Wang & Li, 2015 ) (Gale, et al., 2013 ) ) (Elliott & Fullerton, 2013 ) (Sundar, et al., 2016) (Brooks, 2015) (Pezzey & Jotzo, 2013 ) (Lamperti, et al., 2015) Emission trading, trade, carbon markets 10 (Perthuis & Trotignon, 2013) (Uddin & Holtedahl, 2013) (Anon., 2013) ) (Lutz, et al., 2013) (Rabe, 2016 ) (Stiglitz, 2015) (Cormier, 2013 ) (Erickson, et al., 2014 ) (Sreekanth, et al., 2014) Carbon tax and cap-and trade 5 (Goulder & Schein, 2013) (Lui, 2016 ) (Sewalk, 2013) (Repetto, 2013) Minilateralism 8 (Debaere, et al., 2014) (Falkner, 2015) (Hjerpe & Nasiritousi, 2015) (Happaerts & Bruyninckx, 2013) (Nordhaus, 2015) (Potoski, 2015) (Hovi, et al., 2015 ) (Weischer, et al., 2012) Minilateralism and multilateralism 3 (Engelbrekt, 2015) (Eckersley, 2012) (Morgera & Kulovesi, 2013) Unilateralism 2 (Bernauer, et al., 2014) This unilateralism has been criticized for instance contributing to an inequitable distribution of projects. However the unilateral approach has gained some support and raised a question of whether unilateralism could be used more effectively for example even countries that are certainly capable to have more ambitious emission reduction targets but have been rather reluctant to move forward on GHG mitigation unilaterally.
Kulovesi (2012) studied how to address sectoral emissions outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). She assumed that a coordinated international legal response would be the best way to mitigate climate change. The research focused on the aviation and maritime transport that are excluded from the Kyoto protocol. As a conclusion Kulovesi (2012) stated that all possibilities for managing climate change mitigation including unilateral, bilateral and multilateral agreements should be investigated. In addition she argued that the lack of global agreement on how to address emissions has weakened the unilateral approach.
The strongest criticism towards the unilateral regime presented Schmid (2013) . He studied the role of unilateralism in unequal distribution of Clean development mechanism. Schmid (2013) claimed that the unilateral CDM does not benefit the least developed countries but only the countries that already have an access to international financing. Schmid (2013) assumed that the purpose of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was to involve the participation of the private sector and engage developing countries in to international climate policy. However according to the CDM rules the purpose of the mechanism is to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions and improve the sustainable development regardless of the participation of the private sector. Schmid (2013) also assumes that equal distribution of the projects is part of sustainable development and therefore the unilateral CDM that does not support the equal distribution of the projects does not improve sustainable development.
A more positive attitude towards unilateralism represents Marcucci and Turton (2013) who studied the role of unilateralism technology adoption. Like Kulovesi (2012) , Marcussi and Turton (2013) also stated the lack of globally coordinated measures as a major issue in the climate change mitigation. Their study focused on the electricity sector and they concluded that the unilateral regime might lead to some additional technology learning by using a fragmented regime with moderate climate and technology targets.
The studies have moved towards the assuming that the unilateral regime has become a default regime and studying the effects of unilateralism instead of comparing it to other models. For example Bernauer (2014) studied whether and how such unilateralism affects public opinion. He assumed that the unilateral policies have naturally been more attractive to politicians as seen from the taxation and trade politics. Bernauer (2014) concluded that cost and sovereignty play a significant role in accepting the unilateral regime. In 2015 Bernauer (2014) Kriegler et al. (2015) studied the role of unilateralism in establishing the climate targets via the staged accession scenarios. They assumed that the future climate regime involves strong mitigation efforts but does not have sanctions for the parties emitting too much. The authors concluded that the unilateralism can have an extensive role in both establishing or ruing the climate targets. Kriegler et al. (2015) noticed that the focus in climate change mitigation has shifted from global cooperative action to regional climate action. In fact Kriegler et al. (2015) suspected that the world may be locked into moderate and fragmented climate action because of the institutional, ethical and political challenges. In addition more themes have risen such as the energy security and the development policies and therefore the seek for a universal target might not be the best option.
Multilateralism and minilateralism
Multilateral approach means that more than two parties decide the solution for a problem and make a promise for anyone to follow. As seen in Paris negotiations the traditional unilateral approach is slowly replaced by the multilateral approach. This new approach includes the multilateral assessment of the progress towards the emission reductions for each country. However, Christina Figueres argued that the multilateral process is an ineffective tool for three reasons. First, climate change is a global problem requiring all the countries to participate in the solution, however the multilateral approach has not been able to fully engage all the parties. Second, every country can make a contribution according to their own capability. This means that the multilateral approach might not support the ambitious emission reduction targets enough. Third a unison rules for all the countries are needed to achieve the global target. However the multilateral approach has not succeeded in establishing unison rules for all the participants.
The multilateralism has regarded having some limitations to answer the global climate change challenge. It might be argued that the multilateral negotiations have not succeeded to reach a universal, binding international agreement to cut emissions. In addition the concerns related to the capability of multilateralism have risen.
Therefore alternative options such as minilateralism, standards and climate clubs have been proposed.
It is been discussed whether a multilateral approach should be preferred over a unilateral approach. Even if the unilateralism has become a default model for managing the climate change mitigation it has also been seen as one of the major causes for the failure of the Kyoto mechanism by some researchers. Many researchers proposed alternatives for unilateral model such as multilateral model and minilateralism. Especially the EU has supported the multilateral negotiations leading the kick start of multilateralism at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference. Weischer et al. (2012) assumed that the attempts towards multilateral regime have been too slow and the process towards limiting the greenhouse gas emissions has not been adequate, because there are still a gap between the multilaterally formed pledges and the level actual emission reductions needed. Therefore options outside the Kyoto protocol have gained interest and they might assist the Kyoto protocol to reach its target. The so-called climate clubs have been suggested as an alternative for struggling multilateral regime. Weischer et al.(2012) concluded that the climate clubs might be an option for climate change mitigation strategy. Eckersley (2012) presented a critical view on multilateralism. He studied if the multilateralism could be replaced by more flexible model called the minilateralism. He assumed that the strive for multilateralism has not responded the challenge of climate change mitigation. He assumed that the consensus decision making by 194 parties is impossible. However at Durban the international negotiations gained a second chance. He claimed that the minilateralism could be a more convenient option than multilateralism. Like Wong (2015) claimed that the negotiations have not been ambitious enough and the failure to act now will result in need for more ambitious actions in the future. Hovi et al. (2015) also studied the effectiveness of the climate club approach. They assumed that the current development in negotiations is not adequate but the climate clubs could offer an option. They even claimed that even a club with very few members can grow and reduce global emissions effectively. However the study by Hovi et al. (2015) was one of the few studies recognizing the importance of non-climate benefits instead of merely focusing on the greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Harsh criticism towards multilateralism was also presented by Moncel and Asselt (2012) . They assumed that multilateralism has not supported a political will to reduce emissions so far. However they stated that the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol is no longer solely capable of addressing the problem. They studied how international institutions outside of the UNFCCC have addressed the climate change and concluded that the climate change is simply too complex issue to be solved through a single multilateral forum. Also Engelbrekt (2015) proposed harsh critique on multilateral approach. He stated that the multilateral negotiations to reach a universal, binding international agreement is not consistent with the scientific knowledge on climate change. He assumes that even theoretically multilateralism is not able to bring long-term stability to institutional form. Instead of multilateralism Engelbrekt (2015) suggests minilateralism as a method to address the problem. Morgera and Kulovesi (2012) assumed that the slow process towards multilateral regime have raised a question of alternative models. They aimed to find out if standards could be an option for multilateralism. Morgera and Kulovesi (2012) assumed that the whole question of climate change mitigation has become more visible in political debate. For example it was noticed in the Treaty of Lisbon. Morgera and Kulovesi (2012) discussed whether the EU could promote the progress towards multilateralism and more certain emission reductions. However the authors claimed that even if the EU:s multilateral cooperation struggles to fulfill their emission reduction targets it is becoming a default model for managing the climate change mitigation. Minilateral and bilateral cooperation should be used to support the multilateralism. Also Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013) concluded that the multilateral regime is becoming a default model for EU and other models have not been seriously discussed. They assumed that the EU had lost its power in global climate change negotiation after the Copenhagen failure in 2009 because of the unilateralism and unrealistic expectations. Even if the Durban conference in 2011 was more successful for the EU it still has not gained its power back. EU is among the largest greenhouse gas emitters and the weakened power in global climate change negotiations has diminished its options to reduce the emissions.
The most positive attitude towards multilateralism has presented Stewart (2013) . He claims that the multilateral regime is a necessity to address the problem of climate change, because the unilateral and bilateral agreements have failed to do that. He even stated that the multilateral approach to address the climate change can achieve the emissions reductions in addition to build global cooperation.
Wong (2015) claimed that multilateral agreements should be supported by bilateral agreements to achieve the emission reduction targets. She assumed that the negotiations run by the EU have not been able to deliver transformational change needed to limit the emissions. She even claimed that the gap between what we need to do and what we are doing is not closing but widening. Potoski (2015) studied if the voluntary environmental programs, that are also called the green clubs, could be an alternative for multilateral negotiations. He assumed that the government efforts towards ambitious emission cuts have not been adequate and the effectiveness of a multilateral approach towards emission reductions remains unclear. He concluded that the green clubs can play a significant role in addressing the climate change mitigation problem.
As a conclusion multilateral approach has caused criticism because of the weak link to science and failure to answer the real challenge. One researcher even claimed that the multilateralism can nott work even in theory. However plenty of alternative options have been proposed either to support the multilateralism or to replace it entirely. Some researchers have come into conclusion that even if the multilateralism has been criticized it also becoming a default model for EU. One researcher claimed that the multilateral approach is a necessity to address the problem of climate change.
MInilateralism has been seen as a form of multilateralism but with a limited amount of participants. Debaere & al (2014) examine the G20 as a role of minilateralism. They came into conclusion that the EU supports for ‗effective minilateralism'. However Falkner (2015) studied the role of minilateralism in the international climate regime. He argued that minilateralism is unlikely to overcome the structural barriers, including national political systems to a comprehensive and ambitious international climate agreement. Hjerpe & Nasiritousi (2015) examined the alternative forums tackling the climate change. They confirm the difficulties in coordinating global climate policy in a highly fragmented governance landscape and the weakness of minilateralism. Happaerts & Bruyninckx (2013) explored the formation of regime complexes and the appeal of minilateralism. They argue that the minilateralism does not provide a solution for multilateralism, but The G20 does only have a limited, instrumental role in the regime complex. Engelbrekt (2015) also state that the minilateralism cannot wholly replace the legitimizing role of multilateralism.
As a conclusion minilateralism cannot replace multilateralism and fix the structural problems regarding it but can support traditional multilateralism.
Pledges
The Durban platform offered a new strategy for climate change mitigation which was used in Paris negotiations.
Instead of aiming for a unilaterally set target each country determined their own targets and roadmaps for climate change mitigation. These pledges cover about 80% of current global emissions and they are part of progress towards multilateralism. The pledges are voluntary created but they go through the official evaluation by the UNFCCC. At first the pledges were supported by some researchers but subsequently the approach has been predicted to fail based on historical and scientific analysis since there is still a large gap between actual pledges and the actual emission reductions required to not to exceed the 2 degrees of warming. Glomsrød et al. (2013) studied the effect of the pledges on the biggest polluters and he claimed that several factors support the pledges and they are convenient in terms of emission reductions. Briner and Prag (2013) also stated that the pledges could work under certain circumstances even if they have flaws. He argues that the climate change mitigation needs certain flexibility that pledges could provide.
However some researchers think that -the pledge and review‖ model there is today is not sufficient to mitigate climate change but the global carbon tax would be better. One of the most critical view towards pledges was presented by Riahi et al. (2013) . They claim that the pledges would not result in ambitious emission cuts enough, but instead create a -carbon lock-in‖. This situation would be extremely harmful for the global climate change mitigation. Also Arroyo-Currás et al. (2013) came in to conclusion that the pledges are not ambitious strategy enough for reducing the emissions. Otto et al. (2014) claimed that the pledges are not the best option for climate change mitigation because of the carbon leakage and the lack of efficiency.
Some researcher found that the pledges might be a good option. Chaturvedi (2015) stated that even if the actual pledges do cover the emission reduction needed they are still a good start for fruitful negotiations. However he also stated that Paris will have to find ways to scale up the GHG emission reduction commitments far higher than the current INDC pledges. Hovi et al. (2015) studied the -club approach‖ as an alternative for a pledge approach. They concluded that the pledges with certain conditions can be a useful part of global climate change mitigation strategy.
Market based approach
A market based mechanism means that emissions are regarded as tradable units with a price. According to the Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows countries to sell their excess emission units to countries that need some. Carbon is traded like any other commodity on a global market also called the "carbon market". The purpose of the carbon market is to reduce the emissions by putting a price for carbon and mitigate the climate change costeffectively.
One of the most discussed issue is that should emission reductions be based on global carbon tax or could market based mechanism fulfill the targets. By market based mechanisms we mean mechanisms that allows the trading of greenhouse gas emission allowances. The clean development mechanism is the most important market based mechanism.
The researchers have studied the carbon markets from different perspectives. Some researchers have defined market-based policies to include a wide range of tools from carbon tax to tradable carbon allowances. This means basically any mechanism that puts a price for carbon. Lamperti (2015) included taxes and subsidies into the definition of the market based policies.
Carbon markets can be determined either as one of the tools for achieving the emission reductions but also it can be seen as the final aim of the climate change mitigation policy. Ventura & al (2015) defined carbon markets as a tool to mitigate climate change in a cost-effective way. They left out the global carbon tax from the definition. Uddin and Holtedahl (2012) stated the global carbon market as the ultimate aim of the policies. He assumed that the ultimate goal should be the effective market instead of the global carbon tax.
Bodansky and Rajamani (2012) saw market based approach as an opposite to regulated global carbon tax. Nordhaus (2015) also stated that the market based mechanism is the opposite of government lead regulated approach. Many researchers focused to study specific examples of the market based approach. For example studied the markets for pollution allowances. Sreekanth et al. (2014) , Erickson et al. (2014) , Cormier and Bellassen (2012) studied the clean development mechanism as an example of the most significant market based mechanism. Perthuis and Trotignon (2013) studied the EU Emission trading scheme as an example of market based approach. Burtraw (2013), Rabe (2016) , Carmton and Stoft (2012), Lutz (2013) , Repetto (2013) , Anand and Giraud-Carrier (2013) studied only the cap-and-trade markets. They used example from the US, which is the largest emitter with the cap-and trade scheme.
By the start of 2010s it was clear that the market based approach was to be part of global climate change mitigation strategy in the future with the CDM which is the most significant mechanism for Kyoto. Cramtom (2012) assumed that setting a global price for carbon is essential for emission reductions. He stated that the commonly used cap-and trade system is able to set a price for carbon. Many of the researchers focused merely on the emission reduction. However, Böhm et al. (2012) discussed the possibilities for markets to turn the society more sustainable. They concluded that the carbon markets are unlikely to provide any sustainable benefits because of the capitalist nature of the market.
One of the most positive attitude towards market based mechanism was presented by . He also assumed that the trading of emission allowances is a desirable outcome of the climate policy and finally he concluded that the cap-and-trade has successfully reduced emissions. Also Repetto (2013) came into conclusion that cap-and trade system is a better way for climate change mitigation than global carbon tax. He stated that unlike the cap-and-trade carbon tax allows emissions to vary according to the economic situation instead of leading to steadily declining emissions.
Perthuis and Trotignon (2013) took a slightly more critical view and stated that carbon market needs flexibility to work effectively. However they highlighted the importance of regulation as well. Uddin and Holtedahl (2013) assumed that the carbon markets have become a preferred mechanism but they discussed the importance of global accreditation and standards in reducing the greenhouse gas emissions. They claimed that the climate change mitigation cannot solely being see as an air pollution problem but in a wider scope.
Similar conclusions was made by Burtraw et al. (2013) who stated that carbon price has been created unilaterally leading in to default markets. They assumed that mechanism to put a price on carbon emissions in the United States has not yet reached its final form and cap-and-trade could be a method for this. They stated that the potential linking of individual cap-and-trade programs could be effective. However in order to link different cap-and-trade programs the price for carbon should be the same. That is still not the case yet. LealArcas (2013) discussed how to combine the different goals of international trade agreements and climate change regime. He came into the conclusion that the regional trade arrangements could support the ultimate goal of global climate regime if it is designed well. The author claims that the regional agreements are more effective than an attempt to reach global agreement. He claims that the Kyoto Protocol has not succeeded to engage all the parties to mitigate climate change with effective results. Newel et al. (2013) concluded in their review that carbon markets could work but they should be improved. He found that the unison global carbon market would be desirable, but also utopist with the current policies. Also Sreekanth et al. (2014) came into the conclusion that even if the CDM does not necessarily contribute the sustainable development it is the most significant tool for climate change mitigation. He claimed that the CDM in spite of its flaws is a necessity for getting closer to reaching the emission reduction target. However Erickson et al. (2014) came into conclusion that the net emission reduction derived from the CDM projects are difficult to assess. Lamperti et al. (2015) stated that market-based policies are not always successful to redirect technical change from the dirty to the green sector like government lead regulation also called the -command and control‖ policies.
Moarif (2012) studied the market based approach in emerging economies. He found that by implementing both regulatory and market based policy instruments could be beneficial in terms of climate change mitigation and economic growth. Lutz et al. (2013) presented a more critical view on carbon markets. They claimed that the carbon markets should support the emission reductions in case of the financial recession, but the EU ETS as and cap-and-trade scheme failed to do that. Bodansky and Rajamani (2013) discussed the future climate change mitigation regime and they came in the conclusion that the market based approach is likely to part of any future regime. They found that the climate regime with the market based approach has gained a wide participation. In other words the market based approach is capable of engaging large emitters to the regime. Anand & Giraud-Carrier (2013) presented one of the most critical views on cap and trade. He claimed that there is collusion under cap-and trade and that from the historical point of view the regulation of emissions is inevitable. Nordhaus (2015) concluded that the administrable taxes would be better than markets and less prone to corruption. Unlike Bodansky and Rajamani he claimed that the current regime with market approach has not engaged parties enough to reduce their emissions.
Some researchers came into conclusion that the markets have become a default but slightly ineffective system that should be improved. For example Ventura & al (2015) stated that the CDM has made only a little contribution to sustainable development and emission reductions. They also found that the carbon markets have been facing the financial crises, especially in Europe, which is also the biggest investor. Gupta & Mason (2016) stated that within carbon markets the least developed countries may not be fully empowered to participate the decision making. Also Rabe (2016) stated that cap-and trade model is outdated and a more effective tool for climate change mitigation is needed. He found that in the absence of clear and straightforward federal and international legislation regional climate change policies had risen in U.S He claims that even if discussion on alternative regional tools for climate change mitigation has occurred, the comprehensive cap-and-trade has still remained in core of the climate change discussion.
As a conclusion the market based approach is controversial. Some researchers viewed it as an essential and desirable target for climate change mitigation. Many researchers had more critical view. Market based approach has been as an effective option when the scope of climate change mitigation has been expanded to cover more than just emission reductions.
Carbon tax
A carbon tax means a tax on the carbon content of oil, coal, and gas. Like any other tax the carbon taxes directly raise government revenues. The purpose of a tax is to create public revenues by putting a price on carbon. The carbon tax has been defended by arguing that a tax on carbon would reduce demand for carbon intensive products and thereby reduces total emissions globally. It also creates a stable price for carbon and could possibly work in case when benefits of a certain action are gained in the very long term.
Carbon taxes have already been introduced by a number of industrialized countries, including Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The tax must be well designed to adjust for different market situations. The researchers have tried to focus on how effective the carbon tax is in mitigating the climate change. The studies suggest that an effective carbon tax is high enough to receive an actual response from the emitting sectors such as energy sector. Some researchers regard an effective carbon tax as comprehensive and internationally coordinated. However concerns have raised regarding the motivation of all the large emitters to apply the global tax. Also it has been questioned whether a carbon tax could achieve the emission reductions fast enough. One of the significant issue with carbon tax is that it should be applied globally also in the emerging economies. A carbon tax in the developed nations would lead only to modest emission reductions compared to a global tax.
Carbon tax is a one option that has been suggested but some think that it might not be more effective than -the pledge and review‖. Elliott & al (2012) studied what was the impact of unilateral carbon tax in developing countries. They came into the conclusion that the Border tax agreements, (BTAs) may be effective in reducing the emissions. However the authors found that the carbon leakage resulted from the carbon tax reduces the incentives to mitigate climate change. Other researchers were also positive about implementing a carbon tax. For example Sewalk (2013) stated that the cap-and-trade system is based on weak historical assumptions and the carbon tax would be much better option for the United States. Pezzey & Jotzo (2013) came into similar conclusions but emphasized the importance of planning. They assumed that putting a price on carbon is widely accepted as being far cheaper for countries overall than regulation and tax is the most effective way to put a price on carbon. According to the review by Goulder & Schein (2013) a hybrid scheme with a carbon tax as a part of climate change mitigation strategy is suggested. The authors found that putting a price to carbon is the more cost-effective than direct regulation, but a neither a pure carbon tax or pure cap-and trade can solely solve the problem. They evaluated the effectiveness based on several dimensions such as sharing the political burden. Elliott & Fullerton (2013) completed another study in US and concluded that the carbon tax might be the best option. Subsequently Elliott & al concluded that carbon tax only in Annex1 countries would not be effective but the carbon tax should be adopted globally. Wang & Li (2015) also discussed the importance of carbon tax. They stated that the carbon tax is an effective tool to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. The authors stated that the carbon tax together with removing fossil fuel subsidies could reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. Alton & al (2013) completed a study in South Africa and stated that the carbon tax might increase the welfare in the whole country. They assumed that the carbon tax does reduce the greenhouse gas emissions and evaluated the socioeconomic consequences of the carbon tax. Strand (2013) compared the carbon tax to the cap-and-trade system and concluded that the carbon tax is better for importers. He stated that there is not a big difference between the difference between a climate policy involving a carbon tax, and a cap-and-trade scheme under a carbon tax. The question is mainly on should emissions have a cap or not. One of the most supportive comment on carbon tax was presented by Gale & al (2013) . They concluded that the carbon tax improves the sustainability in the whole society. They discussed the effects beyond the greenhouse gas emissions. They also stated that the carbon tax could raise significant revenues to cover the costs from the climate change mitigation. Gilley & Kinsella (2015) completed a study in China and concluded that some form of taxes are required on products linked with carbon emissions to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions. They focused on the border tax adjustments and the effects on greenhouse gas emissions. Sundar & al (2016) stated that the carbon tax is one of the most important tool for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions. They used a mathematical tool to explain the link between the level of the tax and actual emissions. Stiglitz (2015) discussed that the voluntary agreements will fall short and therefore a carbon tax or equal capand-trade would be better. Stiglitz (2015) discussed that a mechanism to put a price on carbon is essential for emission reductions, but fully voluntary agreement is not likely to be able to deliver emission reductions needed. He concluded that the carbon tax would be an effective method to cover the costs of climate change mitigation.
One of the slightly suspicious opinions was presented by Lui (2016) . He concluded that the world cap-and-trade scheme would improve welfare better than a world carbon tax. However the political barriers for clean energy investments determine if carbon tax or cap-and-trade scheme would be better in cutting emissions. Lui (2016) was the first to discuss the political barriers related to carbon tax. Also Brooks (2015) was critical about some principles related to the taxation. For example he stated that the polluter pays principle is not functional from justice-based perspective. However generally the critical voices on carbon tax have been very modest.
As a conclusion the effectiveness of the carbon tax has been mainly investigated based on the greenhouse gas emissions. However some studies focused also on socioeconomic effects and welfare. The carbon tax was found to be an effective method to mitigate climate change also when looking at the climate change mitigation from the wider scope beyond the greenhouse gas emissions. However the biggest obstacles were seen a political barriers in many countries. However what is not fully agreed is that should carbon tax completely replace the cap-and-trade or could it be part of the solution.
Discussion
In the mid-90s the discussion on climate change mitigation was very narrow. There was a simple target measured simply with GHG-emission reductions in the developed Annex 1-countries. Subsequently more themes, measures, sectors and parties have joined the climate change mitigation discussion. These themes include sustainable development, technology transfer and capacity building. At first targets were presented as reduction in GHG-emissions. Subsequently targets were also presented as technology targets. At first the climate change mitigation was an issue concerning the energy sector in developed countries. However later on also the developing countries have joined the climate change mitigation discussion even if they did not have similar targets as the developed countries. In addition to energy sector other major emitting sectors such transportation, waste and agriculture have joined the discussion. Traditionally an aim was to reach the climate change mitigation targets by regulation. However this turned out to be politically difficult, so different market based approaches were suggested and implemented. These approaches include trading of emission permits and carbon tax. When the discussion has expanded climate change mitigation has become more challenging to manage for Europe led Kyoto protocol. Therefore a discussion on a new regime and tools has risen.
For the future climate change mitigation regime the targets have been agreed quite clearly. The researchers and the parties have agreed on limiting the warming to 2 celcius degrees globally. However couple of issues still remain more unclear. First, how much the climate change mitigation should be regulated and how much could be left to markets? Second, what is the optimal amount of participants? Too little participants would make inadequate contribution but too many participants might not agree on the important issues and the decision making would become more challenging. Third, what is the role of carbon tax in future?
The negotiation strategies have led to different outcomes. Unilateral negotiations have led to establishment of emissions trading schemes in Europe as well as many other parts of the world. With multilateral negotiations, the outcome was different. There was no universal carbon market but instead pledges and climate clubs. Perhaps in the future, climate clubs become more significant and they can establish their own regulation or carbon markets with carbon tax. Figure 2 presents the options for climate negotiations. Unilatralism has lead to limited amount of options while multilateralism has provided more flexibility and options for climate governance. 
Conclusions
The policy arena for the international climate negotiations is shaped by sovereignty of states, diversified interests, and fragmented perspectives on climate change. In addition emission reductions are not universally well addressed. Achieving the global climate agreement faces some structural barriers as well such as the political cycle in states. This is an obstacle for a long term binding global climate agreement and led to EU run unilateral negotiations and establishment of emission trading schemes. The inefficiency of universal negotiations to reduce emissions fast enough and understanding of the global responsibility led to multilateral negotiations and pledges. This approach left countries more flexibility to act on climate change. However the multilateral process is slow and does not fix the structural problems behind the global climate agreement.
